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Medieval and Early Modern Lex mercatoria:
An Attempt at the probatio diabolica*
Charles Donahue, Jr.**
I. A MEDIEVAL LEX MERCATORIA?
It has been too confidently assumed by most writers that the law merchant'
arose in Italy in the central part of the Middle Ages, was chiefly founded on
Roman law, and was carried by the traders of that country ... into every
country which they penetrated. That the law merchant was indeed the law
of the merchants is true enough, and so is the assertion that it was applied
to all transactions of a mercantile character between merchants, particularly
at the great international fairs . . . . But the assumption that the law
originated with the Italian merchants is more than disputable. International
trade is in some measure a constant thing. Although a great revival took
place after the new contact with the East which was made by the Crusades,
commerce at that time simply changed hands, leaving the Arabs, who had
dominated the Mediterranean for about two hundred years, and being
undertaken by the Italians and to some extent by the French, and later by
British and Norwegian merchants. . . . But before the Arabs came the
Romans, and before the Romans the Greeks, and before the Greeks the
Phoenicians.... But even these probably did not originate all which may at
first sight appear to be their work .... We read of travelling merchants from
the times of Jacob and Isaac, of the kings of Arabia, and of the wealthy
Dedan,
Queen of Sheba in the days of King Solomon, and of the trade with
2
Aden and Saba when Tyre was at its greatest and nearing its doom.
Copyright © 2004 Charles Donahue, Jr. All rights reserved. This paper is a summary of the
conclusions of Charles Donahue, Jr., Benvenuto Stracca's De Mercatura: Was There a Lex mercatoria
in Sixteenth-Century Italy? (ComparativeStudies in Anglo-American and ContinentalLegal History, Duncker
& Humblot forthcoming 2004), and Charles Donahue, Jr., Equity in the Courts of Merchants,
Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis (forthcoming Spring 2004). Fuller references will be found in
those works. I have attempted to preserve here the flavor of a talk that I gave at the Symposium,
The Empiical and Theoretical Undetpinnings of the Law Merchant, The University of Chicago Law
School (Oct 16-17, 2003).
Paul A. Freund Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. AB 1962, Harvard College; LLB 1965,
Yale Law School.
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The text reads "merchants."
Wyndham Anstis Bewes, The Romance of the Law Merchant 1-2, 4 (Sweet & Maxwell 1923, reprint
Rothman 1986). The Biblical references are to: Gn 10:7 (Dedan); Gn 25:3 (Dedan); Jer 49:7-8
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The author of this quotation is Wyndham Anstis Bewes (1857-1942),
barrister of Lincoln's Inn, secretary of the Grotius Society and International Law
Association, and author of a number of works on international and commercial
law, including, probably his best-known, and from which this quotation is taken,
The Romance of the Law Merchant (London 1923).'
Bewes's was not a legal mind of the first rank. He does not appear in
Simpson's BiographicalDictionary of the Common Law. His work, however, nicely
illustrates a debate that has been going on for centuries: What is the relationship
between mercantile law, sometimes called "the law merchant," and the English
common law? Bewes's answer is that mercantile law is utterly other from the
common law. It is a transnational body of law that, to use an example from
another author in this tradition, goes back to Abraham's purchase of a field from
the Hittites in the twenty-third chapter of Genesis.4 It was developed by the
Phoenicians, the Greeks, and the Romans, then by the Arabs, and finally by the
Italian merchants of the Middle Ages. From there it passed to all countries of
the west through the great international fairs, not only Saint Denis and
Champagne on the Continent, but also St. Ives and Winchester.
The historian can ask a number of questions of Bewes's account. In the
first place, is it supported by the evidence? Whether it is depends on what you
mean by "supported." That the twenty-third chapter of Genesis tells a story of
Abraham buying a plot of land from the Hittites is undeniable. Whether the
author of Genesis is describing with any accuracy an historical event is at best
questionable. Even if he is, what the Hittites thought they were selling and what
Abraham thought he was buying is probably unrecoverable. Even more
questionable is the line that Bewes draws from the undeniable facts of trading in
the Ancient Near East and of trading in the Middle Ages to the development of
a modern body of law that governed that trading.
The historian might also ask why anybody would be telling this
questionable story in 1923. A hint as to the answer to that question is given in
the foreword to the book by Lord Justice Atkin, one of the most distinguished
appellate judges of his day, and a former commercial law barrister.5 The book, he
said, "will . . .not only create an interest in the past, but give a vision of the
(Dedan and Edom); Ez 27:20 ("Dedan traded with you [Tyre] for saddle cloths"); Ez 27:23
("Haran, Canneh and Eden [i.e., Aden], the merchants of Sheba, Asshur and Chilmad traded with
you [Tyre]'); Ez 38:13 ("Sheba and Dedan, the merchants and all the magnates of Tarshish will
ask .....
3

See Who's Who: An Annual Biographical Dictionagy, sub nomine Bewes, Wyndham Anstis (A & C
Black 1941).

4

Gerard Malynes, Consuetudo, vel, Lex mercatoria: Or the Ancient Law Merchant 2 (Adam Islip 1st ed
1622, reprint Keip 1997).

5

See A.W.B. Simpson, ed, A Biographical Dictionary of the Common Law, sub nomine Atkin, James
Richard at 17 (Butterworths 1984).
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romance that attends the commerce of the present.' ' 6 Even after the Great War,
the social position of the man of commerce was insecure; he had to be endowed
with romance, given a history to match that of the lord or the knight or the
country gentleman. Justice Atkin offered another lesson from the book: "It is,
perhaps, fortunate that the law-makers of former days took little interest in the
rules of commerce . . . . As a result, traders made their own rules and
administered them summarily in their own courts, with the tacit or express
approval of the Sovereign. Such rules have in the course of ages crystallised into
law.

. .

7

This tendentious use of the history of the "law merchant" is with us to this
day. A group of authors, including a Nobel laureate in economics, solemnly
assure us: "[B]y the end of the 11th century, the Law Merchant came to govern
most commercial transactions in Europe, providing a uniform set of standards
across large numbers of locations .... It thereby provided a means of reducing
the uncertainty associated with variations in local practices and limited the ability
of localities to discriminate against alien merchants .... "'
There is a third approach that an historian might take to Bewes's text.
Originality was not the man's forte. By the time he wrote, the trope of tracing
the history of the law merchant back to the Hebrew Bible had a long and
respectable history. The first example in English may be Gerard Malynes's
Consuetudo, vel, Lex mercatoria, first published in 1622. Malynes was a merchant,
not a lawyer. He sought to have mercantile cases treated independently of the
common law. In order to make his argument he had to confront the argument
of some of the common lawyers that the common law was of venerable
antiquity. It had been the law of England, they argued, since the time of Julius
Caesar, perhaps before. There were two answers to this argument. The first,
6

Atkin, Forewardto Bewes, The Romance ofthe Law Merchant at iv (cited in note 2).

7

Id at iii.
Paul R. Milgrom, Douglass C. North, and Barry R. Weingast, The Role of Institutions in the Revival of
Trade: The Law Merchant, PrivateJudges, and the Champagne Fairs, 2 Econ & Pol 5 (1990) (emphasis
omitted). The sources that they cite in support of this proposition are equally tendentious and
unsupported by any critical work in the primary sources. Prominent among these is Leon E.
Trakman, The Law Merchant: The Evolution of CommercialLaw (Rothman 1983). Dean Trakman has
recently modified his views. See Leon E. Trakman, From the Medieval Law Merchant to E-Merchant
Law, 53 U Toronto L J 265 (2003). In the process he seems to have used, although he does not
cite, Stephen Edward Sachs, The Law Merchant' and the FairCourt of St. Ives, 1270-1324 (2002)
(unpublished
AB
thesis,
Harvard
University),
available
online
at
<http://www.stevesachs.com/thesis.pdf> (visited Mar 1, 2004). Sachs's work, together with two
previous articles that also express considerable skepticism about the existence of the "law
merchant" (J.H. Baker, The Law Merchant and the Common Law before 1700, 38 Camb L J 295-322
(1979), reprinted in J.H. Baker, The Legal Profession and the Common Law 341-68 (Hambledon 1986);
L. Stuart Sutherland, The Law Merchant in England in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, in 17
Transactions of the Royal HistoricalSociety 149-76 (Royal Historical Society 4th set 1934)), should be
cited in any serious study of medieval and early modem English mercantile law.

8
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proposed somewhat later by the doctors of civil law, who sought commercial
cases for their courts, was that the law merchant was of equal antiquity, being
derived from Roman law in which they were specialists. 9 Malynes does not make
that argument, though he is perfectly willing to draw on Continental material. He
distances himself from the civilians, however, by arguing that the law merchant
is the creation of merchants and, indeed, of greater antiquity even than Roman
law. It goes back to Abraham, or, at least, to the sale of Joseph to Potiphar by
the Midianite traders. 10
Our second quotation takes a different approach:
What then is this law merchant which opposes itself to the common law
and dominates it? and whence does it come? As a matter of fact, and not
merely of phrase, may we not even ask whether there is a law of merchants,
in any other sense than there is a law of financiers or a law of tailors?
Frequent use of the word has almost produced the impression that as there
was a civil law and a canon law, so also there was somewhere a "law
merchant," of very peculiar authority and sanctity; about which, however, it
is now quite futile to inquire and presumptuous to argue.
If the custom of merchants as to bills of exchange was recognized by
the courts, so also has the custom of financiers as to the "negotiability" of
bonds and scrips been recognized; but no one would think of referring to
the "law financier" in speaking of that "negotiability." The custom of
financiers, as of social clubs or other organizations or coteries, is observed
and enforced by the law; not because the financiers or clubs enacted or had
power to enact laws, but because it is with reference to those customs that
the parties have acted or contracted; and it is with reference to them,
therefore, that rights and liabilities ought to be adjusted. When these or any
other customs obtain general acceptance by the community they then pass
into and for the first time become laws.
law (not merchant-made), with Lord Mansfield as chief
. . judge-made
J

builder, is what we have here.'1
The author of this quotation is John Skirving Ewart (1849-1933). Ewart
was associated with the University of Manitoba in Winnipeg. 12 He too was
interested in international law, but he published on a wide variety of topics. The
quotation is from his chief claim to legal fame, An Exposition of the Principles of
Estoppel by Misrepresentation (Chicago/Toronto 1900), a 548-page treatise that
never saw a second edition.

9

10
11

12

See Mary Elizabeth Basile, Jane Fair Bestor, Daniel R. Coquillette, and Charles Donahue, Jr., Lex
Mercatoria and Legal Pluralism:A Late Thirteenth-Centugy Treatise and Its Afterlife at 139-46 (Ames
Foundation 1998) (italicized pagination in original).
Malynes, Consuetudo at 2 (cited in note 4).
John Skirving Ewart, An Exposition of the Pnrinples of Estoppel by Misrepresentation 373-74, 375
(Callaghan/Carswell 1900).
There is, for example, a J.S. Ewart Scholarship in the Linguistics Department at the University,
see <http://www.umanitoba.ca/linguistics/gradnews.shtml> (visited Mar 1, 2004).
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Ewart's answer to the type of argument that we find in Bewes is less
dependent on history and more on jurisprudential assumptions. 3 There is,
however, some history in what he argues. Mercantile law, he tells us, is not like
civil law or canon law, a system of law that can be determined from a body of
legal literature. If we have his jurisprudential assumptions right, however, that
fact (the factual nature of which is controversial but probably accurate) makes
no difference. Even if there were a body of legal literature that outlined a
systematic law merchant, it still would not be law until it became the command
of a sovereign; until then, it was a body of rules, but it was not law.
Ewart's positivism has some late nineteenth-century overlays. In the
Anglo-American legal system, the way rules become commands of the sovereign
is not normally by legislation, but by elaboration by judges in common-law
courts. And in private law, judges do not determine what might be a good
principle or a good policy to apply to the situation at hand; rather, they
implement the will of the parties. In the case of bills of exchange, the parties had
obviously contracted with reference to the custom of merchants. When the
courts accepted these customs and enforced them, they became law. According
to Ewart, this happened under Lord Mansfield.
This last historical statement is not correct. The acceptance by the
common-law courts of what was called the custom of merchants with regard to
bills of exchange occurred earlier than Lord Mansfield, in the second half of the
seventeenth century. Nor is there any evidence that the courts that accepted this
custom of merchants employed the justification that they were simply enforcing
the terms by which the parties had contracted. Ewart's thumbnail sketch,
however, of a process by which the courts first inquired into custom and then
accepted those customs as law is confirmed by the most recent study of the
topic.' 4 That same study also seems to accept Ewart's Austinian assumptions:

until the courts did this, the author argues, there was no law; there was just
mercantile practice.
Before we get into the question of who was right and who was wrong, we
must ask at whom Ewart's diatribe was directed. The late nineteenth century saw
an explosion of interest in lex mercatoria.As the revival of romantic mercantilism
spread from Germany to France to England to the United States, it was used for
different purposes-purposes that reflected what was important at the time in
the countries in question. If the issues in Germany were legal nationalism,
13

Ewart's argument received a response from a Bewesian perspective: Francis M. Burdick, What Is
the Law Merchant?, 2 Colum L Rev 470 (1902), reprinted as Contributions of the Law Merchant to the
Common Law, in Association of American Law Schools, ed, 3 Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal
History 34-50 (Little, Brown 1909). Ewart replied in an article also entitled What Is the Law
Merchant?, 3 Colum L Rev 135-54 (1903). See also Basile, et al, Lex Mercatoria and Legal Pluralism
at 171-72 (cited in note 9).

14

See James Steven Rogers, The Early Histoy of the Law of Bills and Notes (Cambridge 1995).
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commercialization, and the role of the Volk in the process, and in France a
broadening out of legal thought after a stifling century of the icole de l'exgse, in
England they were codification of portions of the commercial law and the
proposal to establish a separate commercial court. In the United States, the
status of mercantile law was raised in the context of an effort by the Association
of American Law Schools to establish the proposition that law was a learned
profession and that academic training was the only way to achieve that
5
learning.'
As we have seen, the use of lex mercatoria for tendentious purposes goes a
long way back. The same seventeenth century that saw the acceptance of
mercantile custom with regard to bills of exchange as part of the common law
was also a century in which the status of the law merchant with regard to the
common law was controversial. For whatever reason (and the reasons varied
considerably), a wide variety of common lawyers, civilians, and merchants
thought that there was something called lex mercatoria, and that view is important
not only for the political discourse of the period, but also, it would seem, for the
way in which the common lawyers viewed what they were doing when they
pleaded according to mercantile custom and called in mercantile jurors to find
out what the rules were. It also, one must imagine, affected what the merchants
thought they were doing when they served on such juries.16
What if we go back to the period with which Bewes was most concerned,
the Middle Ages? There, if our reading of an anonymous late thirteenth-century
English treatise called Lex mercatoria is correct,17 the relationship between
common law and mercantile law was also controversial. But the terms of the
controversy were different. We do not find anyone in the Middle Ages arguing
that lex mercatoriais part of a transnational body of law, though the fact that alien
merchants would agree to abide by it suggests that there was at least some legal
linguafranca by which overseas trade was conducted. Nor do we find, until the
end of the Middle Ages, anyone arguing that mercantile law is derived from
Roman law, or the law of nature, or the law of nations. What we do find is
someone arguing that mercantile law is at once part of the common law and
independent of it. Mercantile law, the author of our treatise tells us, is the
daughter of the common law, but she has been endowed by her mother and is
quite capable of managing on her own. 8 He also says in another place that
mercantile law arises out of the market,' 9 like the morning mist in the Smithfield
horse market. Though more down-to-earth than Wyndham Bewes, our
15

Basile, et al, Lex Mercatoria andLegal Plura'sm at 162-74 (cited in note 9).

16

Id at 123-62.

17

Lex mercatotia, edited in Basile, et al, Lex Mercatoria and Legal Pluralismat 1-40 (cited in note 9).

18

Id ch 9 at 18.

19

Id ch 1 at 1.
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thirteenth-century author seems at times to have been affected by the romance
of the law merchant. We are less well informed about what the argument on the
other side of the debate was like in the thirteenth century. It seems unlikely that
Austinian positivism was the counterargument. It probably was based on the
perceived limits on the franchises by which the mercantile courts were held. z°
So how should we think about this debate that now seems to be at least
seven hundred years old? Should we ask, as Lex Mercatoria and Legal Pluralism
tries to ask, how differences in context over the course of time made a debate,
which frequently uses the same terms, quite a different debate in each periodone in which to the extent that history was employed it must necessarily be
employed anachronistically? Or should we, as we tried to do in the conclusion to
that book, seek to escape from the terms of the debate by turning to legal
anthropology?2" Or should we focus, as do a number of modern historians, on
who was right?
I am not sure that I have anything to add to what we said about the first
and second questions in the book. I would like to devote the rest of this paper to
the third question: Was there a lex mercatoria in the medieval and early modern
periods? My answer to that question is "no," at least not in the sense that that
term is normally used, and my attempt to prove this involves the probaio diabolica
of my title. The non-existence of something cannot be proved.
The question, as we already have seen, raises large issues of definition. If
we ask simply whether the phrase lex mercatoriawould have been comprehensible
in the medieval or early modern periods, our answer must be "yes," at least in
northern Europe. The phrase was in quite frequent use there from as early as the
thirteenth century. 2 In southern Europe, however, the phrase was not nearly so
common. I will not say that it does not appear in Benvenuto Stracca's De
mercatura (1st ed 1553),23 generally thought to be the first comprehensive treatise
on mercantile law, but a reasonably careful reading of that sprawling work has
failed to disclose it. Nor has an examination of a number, though by no means
all, of Stracca's sources revealed that the phrase is found in the writers of ius
commune-the common law of Europe that was based on university teaching of
both Roman and canon law. This is true without regard to whether these authors
20

Basile, et al, Lex Mercatoria and Legal Pluralism at 51-53 (cited in note 9).

21

See, generally, id at 181-88.

22

Hence, it is unlike "feudalism," another term that has proved controversial in our time. The fact,
however, that it is lex mercatoria rather than ius mercatoriumor mercatorum suggests an origin among
those who were not totally familiar with the lex/ius distinction. Compare Johannes Marquardus
UJohann Marquart], Tractatus poico-iuridicus de iure mercatorum et commerzorum singulari (G6tzius
1662).

23

Benvenutus Stracca [Benvenuto Stracca], De mercaturaseu mercatore tractatus (Venice 1553). There is
no attribution to a printer on the first edition, but the title-page contains the printer's mark of the
Aldine Press. There are reasons to doubt that it is really the work of that press.
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are writing in the tradition of the commentators or in that of the humanists. This
fact should give us pause, for all the standard accounts assign a particular place
of prominence to the late medieval and early modern Italians in the development
of lex mercatonra.
Another absence should be recorded at the outset. No general collection
of customs of merchants survives from the medieval or early modern periods. In
this regard lex mercatoria stands in marked contrast to the ius maritimum that was
collected in such works as the Rhodian sea law (Byzantine and probably from
the early middle ages),24 the LlIbre del Consolat de mar, (published in the fifteenth
century but clearly containing much older elements),25 or the compilations of
maritime law from the Atlantic and Baltic coasts, of various dates, some of
which go back at least to the thirteenth century.26 While the provisions in these
collections vary considerably among themselves, even within a given maritime
area, there are common elements in them that allow us to say that they probably
reflect a body of customary usages that spread across given maritime areas, with
each area, at times, influencing, and borrowing from, the others. Much needs to
be done with the history of maritime law, but we have the material with which to
conduct the study.
I am not sure that the same can be said of lex mercatoria, which I will here
define as the legal rules that govern the conduct and financing of commerce,
independent of the carriage of goods by sea. What survives from the middle ages
by way of custumals are a few from specific courts and one that purports to
describe the procedures in all of the mercantile courts of England.2 ' Beyond that
there are quite a few records of court proceedings, contentious matters such as
are found in the rolls of the fair court of St. Ives, or registrations of transactions,
such as are found in the Schuldbuch of the mercantile court of Hamburg.28
Beyond that still are innumerable records of transactions, most of which did not
prove contentious. 29
Prior to Stracca's De mercatura, there seems to be no attempt in the west to
state generally the body of rules that apply to mercantile transactions. Many
individual rules can be derived from the statutes of particular cities and towns;
24

Walter Ashburner, ed, The Rhodian-Sea Law (Clarendon 1909, reprint Scientia 1976).

25

GermA Colon and Arcadi Garcia [i Sanz], eds, 1-4 IJibredel Consolat de mar (R. Dalmau 1981-87).

26

See, for example, the so-called "Rolls of Oleron," the "Laws of Visby," and the "Laws of

27

Liibeck." Convenient editions of these (of indifferent quality) may be found in Travers Twiss, ed,
3-4 Monumenta Juridica:The Black Book of the Admiraly ([55] Rolls Series, Longman 1874).
Lex mercatoria at 1-40 (cited in note 17).

28

Charles Gross, ed, 1 Select Cases concerning the Law Merchant,A.D. 1270-1638 (23 Publications of the

29

Selden Sociey 1908); Erich von Lehe, ed, Das Hambutgiscbe Scbuldbuch von 1288 (4 Veroffentlicbungen
aus dem StaatsarbivderFreien und HansestadtHambu H. Christians 1956).
A selection of these are conveniently gathered in Robert S. Lopez and Irving W. Raymond, eds,
Medieval Trade in the MediterraneanWorld (Columbia 1955).
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some can be derived from what is stated in passing in the custumals of courts;
still others can be inferred from the results in litigated cases and from the
records of transactions. But there is no book that begins, "These are the good
constitutions and the good customs that concern matters of merchandise, which
wise men who travelled over the world communicated to our predecessors who
composed therewith books of the science of good customs." This is the
for "merchandise," of the early printed
beginning, with the substitution of "sea"
30
edition of the LJibre del Consolatde mar.
Negative evidence is dangerous. It is possible that there was a body of
mercantile customary law as coherent as the maritime law found in the Lbre del
Consolat de mar that was passed on orally from merchant to merchant or from
mercantile judge to mercantile judge. There certainly must have been common
understandings as to the effect of various kinds of transactions; otherwise,
commerce could not have existed. It is striking, however, that in the period from
1100 to 1550, when so many other customs were written down, these, so far as
we know, were not. Dare we apply the adage: De non apparentibuset non existentibus
eadem est raio?31
If such a body of law existed, it would have been in the nature of
customary law, and customary law is a complex and difficult phenomenon. Many
anthropologists would argue that once a body of customary law is written down,
it is no longer customary law. True customary law, they would argue, is held in
the memory, and the fact that it is held in the memory allows those who are
subject to it to believe that it is unchanging while, at the same time, it is
32
constantly being changed to meet new situations and to resolve new disputes.
If this is right, then the redactions of customary law that occurred over the
course of medieval and early modern periods transformed customary law into
something else. We may accept this argument, but the point here is somewhat
different: The fact that a body of customary law was redacted tells us something
about the nature of the customary system that underlay the redacted custom. It
was, we might argue, reasonably coherent and reasonably comprehensive. There
was some underlying structure or system, however different that structure or
system might be from that of the Roman institutional treatises. In short, a
redactable customary law is one that could have been used, even before

30

Colon, 1 Iibre del Consolat de mar m. 46 at 44 (cited in note 25) (the custumal of the early printed
edition is preceded by an ordo of the court in the manuscripts). The translation is borrowed (with
alterations) from Twiss, 3 MonumentaJuridicaat 51 (cited in note 26).

31

Editor's note: "What does not appear might as well not exist."

32

The point is made powerfully in Max Gluckman, The Ideas in BarotseJurisprudence 25 (Yale 1965),
but it is a commonplace and can found in many works of legal anthropology. Compare Sally Falk
Moore, Sodal Facts and Fabrications: "Customagy" Law on Ki/imanjaro, 1880-1980 at 170 (Cambridge
1986, reprint 1990).
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redaction, to resolve new issues and new disputes by whatever the underlying,
and almost always unstated, rules of argument in the system might have been.
There is reason, we might argue, to believe that such a system of customary
law underlay the rules that were redacted in the Llibre del Consolat de mar, that
such a system of customary law underlay the rules that were redacted in the
innumerable customary jurisdictions of the northern two-thirds of France;3 3 and
that such a system of customary law underlay-and this must be more
controversial-the rules that we find expressed in the Treatise on the Laws and
Customs of the Realm of England ascribed to Glanvill.34 But there is no evidence
that such a system of customary law underlay Lex mercatoria, the anonymous
treatise on proceedings in English mercantile courts discussed above. Rather,
what we have in that treatise is a description of how to conduct a certain kind of
court, a court that varies somewhat in its procedures from those of the central
royal courts and the other secular local courts of the period. The variations are
the product of particular mercantile customs. We need not argue here whether
those customs were the creation of the merchants or of the judges of the courts,
but they clearly responded to the perceived needs and desires of the merchants.
Those customs, however, did not add up to a body of customary law. The
default rules of proceeding in these courts (that is, the rules that were used when
there was no specific rule covering the situation) were not provided by an
accepted body of mercantile procedural rules, nor were procedural controversies
resolved by arguing from one mercantile custom to another according to the
rules of argument of mercantile customary law. The default rules of proceeding,
the structure that made argument possible and the rules by which argument
proceeded were all supplied by the common customary law of the realm of
England, with some additions from the common elements in the procedure of
local courts in the same country.35
That proposition, for the demonstration of which I refer you to our book,
immediately raises the question whether there might be something different
about England. The precocious development of the English legal system in the
twelfth and thirteenth centuries is well known.36 It could be that by the 1280s,
when Lex mercatoriawas written, the common law had already overwhelmed the
customary law of merchants as it had, for a large part, overwhelmed the
customary law that we suspect had previously existed in different regions of

33
34

35
36

For a convenient introduction, see Paul Ourliac and Jean-Louis Gazzaniga, Histoire du droitpivi
franfais de rAn mil au Code dvil 31-168 (Albin Michel 1985).
G.D.G. Hall, ed, The Treatise on the Laws and Customs of the Realm of England Commony Called Glanvill
(Nelson 1965, reprint Clarendon 1993).
Lex mercatoriaat 1-40 (cited in note 17).
For a good introduction, see R.C. van Caenegem, The Birth of the Englisb Common Law (Cambridge
2d ed 1988).
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England, and as it was in the process of overwhelming the customary law of
particular localities. Perhaps if we looked to sources outside of England we
would find evidence of a customary body of law of merchants, one that had
already yielded in England to the greater force of the common law.
Such an undertaking is fraught with difficulty because of the intractable
nature of the sources. For the high middle ages, the Continental sources are all
local and particular. None of them attempts to cover the entire field of
mercantile law, and none of them attempts a geographical reach as broad even as
that of our thirteenth-century English treatise. 31 Most, such as the records of
court judgments or those of actual transactions, require that the researcher infer
from the record what the underlying rules might have been. A careful
comparison of this widely scattered material might reveal a common body of
principles and rules peculiar to merchants that might be described as lex
mercatoria, the transjurisdictional body of customary law of medieval merchants,
though I must confess that I have serious doubts.

I1. STRACCA'S DE MERCATURA
These doubts arise from an examination I undertook of Stracca's De
mercatura, in order to afford a comparison with our thirteenth-century English
treatise. What I discovered is quite similar to what we discovered in our English
treatise. Stracca describes a separate set of mercantile courts, courts that vary
somewhat in their procedures from those that employ long-form Romanocanonical procedure. The variations are, in some cases, the product of statute,
but in most cases, the product of juristic elaboration. Sometimes mercantile
custom plays a role, though more often in the substantive than in the procedural
realm. The statutory variations and the customs clearly responded to the desires
and perceived needs of the merchants. But those variations and customs did not
add up to a body of law. The default rules, the structure that made argument
possible, and the rules by which argument proceeded were all supplied by the ius
commune. For the details I am going to have to refer you to two forthcoming
papers on Stracca's work.38 All we have space for here are the conclusions.
Does Stracca's work provide any evidence about the existence of a lex
mercatoria in the sense of a body of customary law like that of the Llibre del
Consolat de matg' The answer must be a rather emphatic "no." Stracca's world is
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In its final part, it suggests that a mercantile court in London can obtain a record of a judgment of
a mercantile court in Paris. Lex mercatoriach 21 at 38-40 (cited in note 17).
See Charles Donahue, Jr., Benvenuto Stracca's De Mercatura: Was There a Lex mercatoria in SixteenthCentury Italy? (Comparative Studies in Anglo-American and Continental Legal Histoy, Duncker &
Humblot forthcoming 2004), and Charles Donahue, Jr., Equity in the Courts of Merchants,Tijdschrift
voor Rechtsgeschiedenis (forthcoming Spring 2004).
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the world of the ius commune, overlaid with a rather thin veneer of humanism.39
Whatever question Stracca is posing, he usually begins with Roman law, and less
frequently, though occasionally, with the canon law. Then he looks to the
commentators. Frequently, we suspect, he looked to the commentators without
looking at the primary texts. He is a Bartolist writing in the Bartolist tradition.
He views the law through Bartolist lenses. His style of argumentation is that of
the doctors of the ius commune of the fourteenth through the mid-sixteenth
centuries. 4° His principal tool of analysis is the multifarious uses of the term
"equity. '' 4' He refers to local Italian statutes dealing with merchants and their
courts relatively frequently, and he interprets these statutes, as was the practice,
in the light of the ius commune.4' He refers to the customs of merchants relatively
infrequently, and when these customs are examined, they turn out to be customs
that vary slightly from the ius commune and can easily be accommodated within
it.43 He never, so far as we can tell, uses the term lex mercatoriaor ius mercatorum. If
we puzzled over what the author of our anonymous late-thirteenth-century
English treatise meant by lex mercatoria,we do not have to puzzle in the case of
Stracca. So far as we can tell, the term meant nothing to him.
Perhaps no legal work is free of the tendentious, and Stracca's bent is
relatively easy to see. He thought that answers to the legal questions that were
facing the merchants could be found in the ius commune, and he showed them, or
their lawyers, where to find them. He thought that mercantile courts could, and
should, be run by a variant of Romano-canonical summary procedure, and he
spelled out how this was to be done. He quite obviously thought that mercantile
courts were sometimes unprincipled, and he rather firmly said so. He called on
the judges of those courts to do better, making use of those persuasive powers
that he had. In doing this he quite explicitly appealed to religion, to canon law,
and to Roman law.'
Once we realize, however, that the world out there was not quite as Stracca
would have liked it to be, is it possible that what was happening was that
mercantile courts were, in fact, being run according to a body of customary law
(call it lex mercatoriaif you will), that Stracca sought to bring into line with the ius
commune, as he understood it? It is possible, but what Stracca says does not
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See Donahue, Benvenuto Stracca'sDe Mercatura § 3 (cited in note 38).
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See id §§ 3-5.
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See id § 3, and Donahue, Equiy in the Courts of Merchants §§ 1, 6 (cited in note 38).
See Donahue, Benvenuto Stracca'sDe Mercatura (cited in note 38) and Donahue, Equioy in the Courts
of Merchants (cited in note 38). The requirement that courts of merchants proceed according to
equity was, it would seem in many instances, based on statute.
See note 48 for a good example.
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Stracca, De mercatura 8.6, folio 284v-285r, no 1-3 (cited in note 23) is a good example of all these
points.
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suggest that that was the case. What Stracca criticizes is the attitude of the
mercantile judges who say that they can decide cases according to equity without
knowing what the law is. They are not saying, "we have our law, and it's not
yours." They are saying, "we judge according to equity, and we don't have to
bother about the details."45 Now it is possible that by the sixteenth century,
Italian merchants and consules had been brainwashed into believing that the only
law was what was contained in the two great cotpora, but I doubt it. Sixteenthcentury Italians, particularly sophisticated ones, were well aware of the
6
multiplicity of laws. Every city worthy of the name had its Jurapropria. There
were glossed versions of Lombard law and feudal law, and, in the case of the
latter, contemporary commentaries.4 7 When the merchants did have a custom,
as they did in the case of certain kinds of proof and the validity and effect of
certain kinds of transactions, they did not hesitate to mention it. Frequently
these customs could be accommodated into the ius commune. Sometimes the
doctors argued that the custom was unsound, though in the one notable debate
on this topic that I have examined in Stracca, he sides-with qualifications48
with those who argued for the validity of the custom. What sixteenth-century
Italian merchants did not have, at least so far as we can tell from Stracca, was a
separate legal system. Their system, like that of the city-states in which they
lived, was the ius commune, to which the statutes that applied to them and such
customs as were accepted as valid provided exceptions.
We need not, moreover, rely solely on Stracca in our assertion that the
Italian merchants in the period of the ius commune did not have a separate legal
system. In the sources cited by Stracca, there are two pieces of evidence that the
effective legal system for the Italian merchants was the ius commune. The first is
the consilia, of which thousands have survived. The doctors rendered their
opinions according to the ius commune, with some, but not many, qualifications
49
when they were dealing with mercantile matters. The one thing that we can be
sure of in the case of consilia is that they are not the maunderings of academics
trying to devise an ideal system of law apart from the realities of the situation.
People paid for consilia; they paid so much that many of the doctors grew rich
because of them. It would, of course, be foolish to think that a consilium, once
rendered, was invariably followed. The practice of obtaining multiple consilia
45
46
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Id.
Bibliography in Helmut Coing, ed, 1 Handbuch der Quellen und Literatur der neueren europaischen
Privatrechtsgeschichte,1 Mittelalter (1100-1500) at 573-86 (Beck 1973).
Bibliography in id at 165-68, 186-88, 320, 344-45.
The question is how much probative weight is to be given to mercantile account books and the
related question of proof of a merchant's handwriting. Stracca, De mercatura 8.1, folio 253v-254r,
no 37-36; 8.5, folio 282r, no 12 (cited in note 23).
See, for example, Donahue, Benvenuto Stracca's De Mercatura at 3-5 (cited in note 38), and
Donahue, Equioy in the Courts of Merchants §§2-5 (cited in note 38).
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shows that they were frequently weapons to be used in a continuing argument.
If, however, the arguments of the doctors in consilia in mercantile cases were
simply irrelevant to the law as the merchants understood it, it is hard to imagine
that they would have paid good money for the consilia.
The second piece of evidence for the relevance of the ius commune to the
world of the Italian merchants of the sixteenth century is the loving care with
which the doctors elaborated a body of law concerning them. It is hard to
imagine, for example, that the discussion of whether a creditor had to exhaust
his remedies against the principal debtor before proceeding against a surety or
the third-party owner of hypothecated property would have proceeded through
the tortured twists that it did over the course of two centuries if the question
were totally an academic one. A large number of courts, including, it would
seem, all the courts of merchants, had the power to proceed de bono et aequo or
according to some variant of that formula. It obviously made a considerable
practical difference to the many personal sureties and holders of hypothecated
property whether the creditor could proceed against them without first trying to
collect from the principal debtor.5 0 The doctors struggled with the issue and
ultimately came up with what looks like a workable practical solution, totally
within the compass of the ius commune.
III. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, let me offer a couple of qualifications. It is well known that
throughout the medieval and early modern period courts throughout Europe
modified their procedures to accommodate merchants. These tribunals adapted
their procedures to the perceived needs and desires of the merchants (1) by
devising mechanisms whereby specific mercantile customs could be alleged
before the court, (2) by speeding up the process of litigation and removing
formalities, (3) by permitting proof of mercantile transactions different from the
proof that they would allow for other kinds of transactions, and (4) by providing
mechanisms for rapid execution of judgments.5' In short, jurists and legislators
responded to the perceived desires and needs of merchants and thereby
provided the legal infrastructure that even economists are now coming to realize
is necessary for trade to flourish. This is an important historical phenomenon. It
does not mean, however, that these jurists and legislators responded by
incorporating into their own law some customary body of law called lex
50
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See Donahue, Equioy in the Courts of Merchants 5 5 (cited in note 38); [Rotae Genuae] De mercatura
decisiones dec 13, nu 19, p 64a; dec 78, nu 3-4, p 204a-b; dec 90, nu 4-5, 10, pp 218b, 219b; dec
91, nu 25, p 224 (Pettus Landry 1593).
Knut Wolfgang N6rr, Procedurein Merrantile Matters: Some ComparativeAspects in Vito Piergiovanni,
,
ed, The Courts and the Development of Commercial Law 195 (2 Comparative Studies in Continental and
Anglo-American LegalHistogy, Duncker & Humblot 1987).
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mercatoria or ius mercatorum. Indeed, the very diversity of the mechanisms by
which the different regions and ultimately different states achieved these
common results would suggest that this was not the case.
2
More troubling for my thesis is the work of Professor Vito Piergiovanni.1 I
take it that Professor Piergiovanni agrees with me that there is relatively little in
Stracca's work that is new. The Italian jurists had been adapting the ius commune
to the needs and desires of the merchants since at least the time of Bartolo and
Baldo. To put it bluntly, there is much in Stracca which, if written by a university
student today, would find that student before a university tribunal answering
charges of plagiarism. 3
Where Professor Piergiovanni's work is troubling for my thesis is in his
suggestion that, prior to the time of Stracca, the mercantile tribunals in Italy had
operated pretty much independently of the procedures of the ius commune. It was
only, he suggests, in the sixteenth century-and perhaps as a result of Stracca's
work and that of the Genoese Rota-that they came to apply a modified version
of Romano-canonical procedure. He relies on fifteenth-century consilia in
4
support of this proposition, particularly those of Bartolomeo Bosco.
It is always difficult to tell what kinds of procedures a court is following in
the absence of records from the court itself. Bosco's consilia do suggest that the
mercantile tribunals in Genoa operated largely independently of the other
55
tribunals and that they followed different procedures. How different is not easy
to know, but I think that I can concede-at least for the sake of argument-that
there were indeed mercantile tribunals in Italy that were operating, as late as the
fifteenth century, with procedures that were quite different from those of the ius
commune. But that tribunals that deal with merchants use a different procedure
from the prevailing one in the area does not necessarily mean that there was a
system of customary mercantile law. The tribunals in the city of London
throughout the high medieval and well into the early modern periods operated
with a procedural system and substantive rules that were quite different from
those of the common law. 6 The fair courts of Champagne operated with a
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See, for example, Vito Piergiovanni, Statui, din/to commune e processo mercantile, in Aquilino Iglesia
Ferreir6s, ed, El dret comii i Catalunya:Actes del VII Simposi International,Barcelona, 23-24 de maig de
1997 at 137 (Fundaci6 Noguera 1998); Vito Piergiovanni, Dirito e giustiza mercantile a Genova nel
XV secolo: I consilia di Bartolomeo Bosco, in Ingrid Baumgartner, ed, Consilia im spliten Mittelalter. vZum
histonischen Aussagewert einer Quellenga/tung 65-78 (13 Schtiftenreihe des Deutschen StudienZentrums in
Venetia, Thorbecke 1995), both with references to previous work.
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See Piergiovanni, Statu/i (cited in note 52).
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See, for example, Bartolomeus de Bosco, Consilia, no 450 (ohannes Forbinus) at 705a-b
(Franciscus Castellus 1620).
A comprehensive study of the work of this court is badly needed and has been undertaken by
Penny Tucker. In the meantime, regesta of the surviving medieval records may be found in A.H.
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procedure (I'm not sure that we can say much about the substance) that was
quite different from that of the customary procedure of Champagne." There are
some elements that these procedures have in common. There may have been
more; we know relatively little about how contentious cases proceeded at
Champagne. But the elements of commonality pale in comparison with the
differences. London procedure and substance look much more like the English
common law. Champagne procedure, to the extent that we know it, looks much
more like French customary law. The decline of the fair courts of Champagne
prevents our knowing what would have happened to this procedure as time
went on; but in the case of London, generations of lawyers trained in the
common law brought the London procedure and substance closer to that of the
common law, the same phenomenon that is noted in the case of the mercantile
courts in Genoa. These examples would suggest that what we note as different
about the London courts-or the fair courts of Champagne, or the Genoese
mercantile courts of the fifteenth century-is more likely to be the product of
local custom and local creativity than it is to be product of some preexisting
transnational system of mercantile customary law.
The law merchant, Levin Goldschmidt taught us more than century ago,
was the creation of merchants, by merchants and for merchants.58 They ran
their own courts, and it was their law. A century of research has shown that
those statements were a considerable exaggeration. Yes, medieval merchants did
participate in the operation of courts that dealt with mercantile matters, but they
rarely, if ever, did it totally independently of local political power. So far as the
law itself was concerned, there were probably some mercantile customs that
made trading possible-some quite local and some of wider extent. These
customs did not, however, add up to a mercantile legal system, for wherever we
see such a system created it is the work of men who are imbued with a scheme
of law that is not the creation of merchants but, in the case of England, of the
customary courts of the realm, or, in the case of Italy, of the doctors of the ius
commune.
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Thomas, ed, Calendarof Early Mayor's Court Rolls of the Ciy of London, 1298-1307 (Cambridge 1924),
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(Cambridge 1926-61).
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Does this mean that there is no room for romance in the history of trade?
Of course not. At approximately the 9same time as Bewes was romanticizing the
law merchant, John Masefield wrote:
Quinquireme of Nineveh from distant Ophir,
60
Rowing home to haven in sunny Palestine,
With a cargo of ivory,
And apes and peacocks,
Sandalwood, cedarwood, and sweet white wine.
Stately Spanish galleon coming from the Isthmus,

Dipping through the Tropics by the palmgreen shores,
With a cargo of diamonds,
Emeralds, amethysts,
61
Topazes, and cinnamon, and gold moidores.
Dirty British coaster with a salt-caked smoke stack,
Butting through the Channel in the mad March days,
With a cargo of Tyne coal,

Road-rails, pig-lead,
Firewood, iron-ware, and cheap tin trays.
There is plenty of room for romance in the history of trade; let us just not
extend it to the history of the law concerning trade.
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John Masefield, Cargoes, in Salt-Water Poems and Ballads 124 (Macmillan 1916), and many times
reprinted.
I'm afraid I'm just not a romantic. While it is possible that one could have gotten a quinquireme
from Ninevah, on the Tigris, to Ophir, probably on the southern coast of the Arabian peninsula,
via the Persian Gulf, there is no way that one could, then or now, have gotten it back to Ninevah
by way of Palestine. Indeed, there was no way, prior to the digging of the Suez canal, that one
could have gotten it from Ophir to Palestine without going around the Cape.
A former Portuguese coin.
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